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For much of the 2006-07 academic year, elements of the US Naval War Col-lege facilitated an elaborate process designed to provide the intellectual foun-
dations for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and his staff to draw upon in 
drafting a new maritime strategy.l The process brought together experts from 
throughout the world to take part in workshops, strategic foundation "war" games, 
conferences and listening sessions.2 It was my privilege as the Charles H. Stockton 
Chair of International Law to selVe as legal advisor throughout the process. This 
article summarizes the contributions of the Naval War College International Law 
Department (ILD) in the process to develop and define the relationship between 
maritime strategy and law, particularly international law, and provides the au-
thor's thoughts on what course that strategy should take. 
Three decades have now elapsed since Daniel Patrick O'Connell challenged our 
thinking with his book The Influence of Law on Sea Power} In it, the New Zealand 
law of the sea expert and Chichele Professor of Public International Law argued, 
shortly before his death in 1979, that because the law of the sea "has become the 
stimulus to sea power, not its restraint,"4 future naval operations planning staffs 
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must acquire a thorough appreciation of the law.; In contrast to Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and the more recent naval historians who, while providing illumi-
nating analyses of the influence of sea power on history,6 mostly disregard the in-
fl uence of international law on sea power, Professor O'Connell forcefully argued 
that sea power doctrines can no longer be considered in isolation from the relevant 
law. More importantly, O'Connell recognized that international law can be a pow-
erful strategic enabler. The question I asked m yself as I launched into my new task 
last fall was, "Has the naval strategy community heeded Professor O'Connell's ad-
monition?" Let me attempt to answer that question by taking the reader on a brief 
tour of our maritime strategy development process and the role oflaw and legal ad-
visors in that process. 
The Maritime Strategy Project 
At the June 2006 Current Strategy Forum, Admiral Mike Mullen, one year into his 
tenure as CNO (and one year before his nomination as Chairman of the 'oint 
Chiefs of Staff), called for the development of a new maritime strategy to guide the 
maritime services in the coming years.? It is to be a strategy of this age and for this 
age. The new strategy document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,8 
developed under the overall leadership of Vice Admiral John Morgan, Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Strategy (N3/N5), joins several other naval 
capstone planning documents, induding Sea Power 21,9 which, together with Ma-
rine Corps Strategy 21,10 provides the vision that establishes the strategic ends; the 
Navy Strategic Plan, which lays out the ways and means to achieve the vision; ll the 
CNO-CMC Naval Operations Concept, which addresses the operational principles 
that will be used by the services;12 and the US Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime 
Safety, Security, mId Stewardship. U At the June 12-13, 2007 Current Strategy Fo-
rum, the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard announced 
their readiness to join the CNO in signing the new maritime strategy when it is 
completed, making it a true strategy of all three sea services.14 In the summer of 
2006, the CNO tasked the Naval War College to act as broker for an ordered com-
petition of maritime strategy ideas-ideas that would inform and guide the care-
fully selected team charged with drafting the new strategy. It was made dear from 
the start that there were no preconceived ideas and that no suggestions were to be 
off limits. The War College was also asked to facilitate a conversation with the 
country-indeed with the world-to describe our process and solicit feedback. IS 
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Security Strategies in the United States 
We were not asked to compose the new strategy on a blank canvas. Indeed, we 
worked on one that was already suffused with an elaborate landscape. The new 
maritime strategy will be nested in what has become a multifaceted web of securi ty 
strategies fo r the nation, all of which emanate from the Natio1lal Security Strategy of 
the U1Iited States. 16 The National Securi ty Act of 1947, as amended by the 
Goldwater·Nichols Act of 1986, requires the President annually to submit to the 
Congress a National Security Strategy (NSS) report. 17 The President's NSS vision is 
in turn implemented by the Natio1lal Defeuse Strategy promulgated by the Secre· 
tary of Defense and the Nati01laf Military Strategy issued by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs ofStaff.18 Closely related to those are the Nati01laf Strategy for Mari-
time Security, the Natio1lal Strategy for Homela1ld Security, the Maritime Strategy for 
Home/and Security, the National Strategy for Combati1lg Terrorism and the Natio1lal 
Strategy to Combat Weapo1ls of Mass Destruction . Not surprisingly, many of the 
strategy documents have classified versions. 
I should add that this was not the first time the US Navy has launched a grand 
strategy development project. Indeed, research by the Center for Naval Analyses in 
the fall of 2007 identified at least seventeen Navy capstone planning documents 
since the 1970s. 19 It is noteworthy for this observer that none of the earlier Navy cap-
stone strategies, or NavaJ Doctrine Publication I on Naval Waifarel°-which "intro· 
duces who weare, what we do, how we fight, and where we must go in the future"-
expressly discusses the role of law and legal institutions in naval operations, other 
than to make a passing reference to the fact that naval mobility would be better as· 
sured if the United States acceded to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea {1982 LOS Convention ).21 
Strategy as a Critical Component of the Geo-strategic Environment 
Strategy is said to be "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of 
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, 
and/or multinational ob;ectives."22 In setting out to achieve those national objec· 
tives, strategy must be adapted to the strategic environment in which it will oper· 
ate.2J Accordingly, to provide the development team with the foundation they 
needed to prepare maritime strategy options for the CNO, the Naval War College 
began by convening a Geo·strategic Environment Workshop. The workshop par· 
ticipants drew heavily on the National Intelligence Council assessment "Mapping 
the Global Future. "24 Later, a British perspective was provided by the UK Ministry 
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of Defence Development and Concepts Doctrine Centre's "Strategic Trends 2007-
2036."25 The experts' conclusions were sobering.26 
The reader is likely familiar with much of the strategic environmental picture, so 
I will only summarize the most salient features. Geopolitical entropy, disorder and 
uncertainty are on the rise.2' The world is said to be suffe ring from a global securi ty 
deficit.28 Unsustainable population growth rates, the "youth bulge" and chronic 
unemployment are most pronounced in those regions lying in the so-called arc of 
instability. State sovereignty and territorial integrity are on the dedine.29 State 
powers are increasingly diffused and devolved. Many States, even some of the most 
developed States, are besieged by an unrelenting flow of illicit weapons, drugs, 
money and migrants across their borders. At the same time, through what some 
have described as the democratization of violence and oftechnology,30 States have 
lost their historical monopoly on the large-scale use offorce and on access to weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies.3l Indeed, the global picture looks 
much the same as it did in 1921, when William Butler Yeats penned his apocalyptic 
poem The Second Coming: 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
AIe full of passionate intensity. 
Grim verses, indeed, whose dark and disturbing images still ring true. 
Economic securi ty is widely recognized as a vital interest of the State. n Yet, pres-
ent efforts are not sufficient to meet basic security needs even within the borders of 
many States,let alone provide the kind of stability needed by the globalized, inter-
dependent and tightly connected economy of the tv.renty-first century. Contempo-
rary security strategies must be designed to manage threats to the public order. 
Those threats come from States and non-State actors. We are painfully aware that 
the threats know no geographical boundaries, particularly as globalization in-
creases the porosity of borders. Accordingly, the threats must be detected and 
managed in the commons, at boundaries between the commons and States, and 
along the borders of adjacent States. 
In an age when the international supply chains that sustain the global economy 
and the seas over which those chains are carried are the common concern of all 
States, global order-including order on the sea-is the new raison d'etat and 
must be the goal of every maritime security policy and strategy. Irresponsible and 
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incompetent flag States; failing and failed States; transnational terrorist organiza-
tions; criminal syndicates engaged in trafficking in weapons, drugs and hwnans; 
and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing all undermine order in the com· 
mons. Here in the global commons, where the pinch from flag States falling short 
in their responsibility to "effectively" exercise jurisdiction and control over their 
vessels is felt most acutely,n the security deficit is most urgent. 
The Strategic Foundations Games 
Following the August 2006 Geo-strategic Environment Workshop, a series of exec· 
utive group meetings and war games were conducted in September and October of 
2006 to develop strategic foundations for use in the Maritime Strategy Options De· 
velopment Workshop in December. Those options were later vetted through the 
Options Refinement Decision Support Event in February of 2007. The Interna· 
tional Law Department provided legal advice to all of the war game teams and to 
two of the executive groups. Early on in the process, it also provided a brief to the 
Red Team Executive Group suggesting possible "lawfare" strategies and tactics that 
might be used against the Blue Team.).! During this same period, the Naval War 
College hosted a conference on the maritime implications of China's energy strat-
egy,3) an Intercessional Conference on Maritime Strategy and a workshop entitled 
Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century. )6 ILD attended 
each of the events and an IlD member (the author) participated in the Economics 
and Maritime Strategy Workshop, submitted a paper on legal interoperabili ty chal· 
lenges and made a presentation on international cooperation in securing the mario 
time commons.)7 
The Future Global Legal Orders Workshop 
let me now turn to something of greater interest to readers of this volume, all of 
whom will likely appreciate that law-that is, rule sets, legal processes and 
international institutions38-is as much a part of the geo·strategic environment, 
and therefore the planning "context," as geography, energy, demographics, orga· 
nizational culture and technology. The international system consists principally of 
sovereign States, who collectively comprise a horizontal, non-hierarchical global 
order that has historically been described as one of moderated anarchy, at least by 
the realists.39 Conventional wisdom posits that within that system, international 
institutions and organizations ameliorate the anarchy, but with few exceptions 
they do so without altering its horizontal structure. 
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The experts who participated in the Geo-strategic Environment Workshop ex-
hibited little fai th in existing international organizations and in international law. 
Three sample findings demonstrate the depth of their skepticism. First, they con-
duded that "some international organizations are looking long in the tooth and in-
capable of coping with emerging challenges." Next they cond uded that "some of 
the institutions that are charged with managing global problems may be over-
whelmed by them" and "the nwnber of bilateral agreements will rise as international 
organizations continue to fall short in their objectives." Given the experts' harsh 
judgment of international organizations and regimes, their prescription, "Interna-
tional Organizations: out with the old, in with the new," should not surprise you. 
The Workshop experts' conclusions added credence to the view that interna-
tional law is merely "epiphenomenaL"40 What really affects State behavior is State 
interests-that is, the underlying economic and political factors .4! Legal academics 
have expressed related doubts about international law. International lawyers no 
doubt recall John Austin's nineteenth-century conclusion that international law 
was not positive law at all, but rather a body that partakes more of a moral obliga-
tion, violation of which may provoke the hostility of other nations but not the kind 
of sanctions that attend violation oflaws promulgated bya sovereign.42 And H.L.A. 
Hart famously observed that because international law lacks the formal structure 
of legislative courts with compulsory jurisdiction and official sanctions it is far 
more primitive than the m unicipal law enacted by a sovereign.4) 
The Workshop report left some of us wondering whether their views were shared 
by international law experts. Mindful that the state of the future global legal order is 
a vi tal component in the geo-strategic environment, the President of the Naval 
War College convened a two-day workshop that brought forty-two legal experts 
together to examine the global legal order in 2020.44 Those experts were asked to 
provide the legal component that is too often neglected in strategy documents. 
With few exceptions, military strategists have a long history of giving short 
shrift to international law in their writings.4S The origin of the problem can be 
traced back to Carl von Clausewitz, who dismissively referred to those "certain 
self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as in-
ternationallaw and custom."46 George F. Kennan, the leading architect of Amer-
ica's Cold War containment security strategy, is also remembered for his attack on 
what he saw as an excess of "legalism and moralism" in American foreign policy 
during the Wilson presidency years.47 Regrettably, international lawyers have not 
always done their part to engage with strategy planners. to help them forge plans 
that can achieve strategic goals while respecting and even advancing the rule of 
law. The experts who came to Newport were ready to do just that. in the hope that 
the strategists were ready to listen. 
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And what a distinguished group they were. They came to Newport from Argen-
tina and Australia, from Canada and Chile, and from India, Indonesia and Italy. In 
all, they represented eleven countries. They were law professors; international law 
specialists from the US Departments of State, Justice and Homeland Security and 
the Center fo r Naval Analyses; a Chinese law of the sea scholar; senior legal advisors 
to the Indian Coast Guard and the Italian Navy General Staff; the legal counsel to 
the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; senior judge advocates for the US Ma-
rine Corps, Coast Guard, and several combatant and fleet commands; and the Di-
rector of the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. They brought 
backgrounds in international security law, law of the sea, anns control and prolif-
eration, the law of armed conflict, international transportation law, international 
criminal law and international organizations. 
The Workshop began with a brief discussion of some assumptions proposed by 
the conference chair concerning the role and reach oflaw.48 The firs t was the prag-
matic observation that the new maritime strategy must be adapted to the global le-
gal order in which it will function. The second was that a robust and respected legal 
order has the potential to save lives, by providing predictability and preventing 
conflicts, and by providing effective and peaceful means to resolve conflicts that do 
arise. The third assumption was that, while the fu ture state of the legal order is un-
certain, it can, to some degree, be mapped and shaped, and-as Thomas Friedman 
reminds us-"the future belongs to the shapers and adapters."<f9 
To avoid what the influential British strategist Colin Gray labels the "sin of 
presentism,"SO the legal experts attempted to widen their temporal lens by explor-
ing several "alternative futures," using the scenario-planning method championed 
by futurists like Peter Schwartz and Philip Bobbitt.51 They initially discussed six 
strawman scenarios that would collectively map the future global legal order, be-
fore adopting an approach that focused on twelve areas of potentially significant 
changes in the legal order. For each of the twelve areas, the experts examined the 
possible trends in the rule sets, legal processes and institutions, and in compliance 
levels. Next, they were asked to consider the consequences of those changes to the 
maritime strategy mission inventory and for the means and methods for carrying 
out those missions. Finally, they were asked what the new maritime strategy should 
say-and not say-about international law. 
One would expect that forty-two lawyers from eleven different nations would 
find li ttle on which to agree. To some extent, that was the case with this group. 
There was, however, one question on which every expert agreed: the new mari-
time strategy should include an express reference to international law. As one ex-
pert put it, international law "is the foundation on which we operate; it is why we 
are there." 
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The Role of Law in the New Maritime Strategy 
As the legal experts concluded, there are a nwnber of compelling reasons to em-
brace the rule oflaw in the new maritime strategy and no sufficient reason for fail-
ing to do so. The new strategy must be consistent with higher-level security 
strategies. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States expressly cites 
the importance of enforcing the rule oflaw.52 Similarly, the presidential directive 
on national maritime security made it clear that in developing the National Strategy 
for Maritime Security (NSMS) the United States will act consistently with interna-
tional and US law.53 The NSMS opens its chapter on "strategic objectives" by quot-
ing the presidential directive to "take all necessary and appropriate actions, 
consistent with U.S. law, treaties, and other international agreements to which the 
United States is party .. .. "$4 
But even if the higher-level strategy documents were silent on the role oflaw, a 
maritime strategy that acknowledges the importance of law as an ordering force 
and a unifying theme for the crucible of international relations-in short, the 
"centre" Yeats longed for- will be far more compelling and durable. Such a docu-
ment would also be a source of pride and inspiration for the members of our armed 
forces, a confidence-building measure for our friends and allies, and a key enabler 
in our ability to shape the fu ture global order. 
Law as an O rdering Force 
The United States has a long tradition of calling upon international law when it 
serves the national interest.55 In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
the infant republic raised international law objections to Great Britain 's boarding 
of US vessels on the high seas and impressment of US sailors into the Royal Navy, 
and against the Barbary States for piratical attacks on US merchantmen in the 
Mediterranean Sea and its approaches. Two other disputes between the United 
States and Great Britain-leading respective1y to the Caroline exchange of notes 
and the Alabama arbitration award-produced enduring international principles 
well known to the readers of this volume.56 More recently, the nation invoked in-
ternational law against Iran for breaching the inviolability of the US embassy in 
Tehran and holding US diplomatic personnel and other citizens hostage, and against 
the People's Republic of China for its conduct when a US Navy EP-3 was forced to 
land on Hainan Island following a midair collision with a Chinese fighter. 
Although national interest is surely the midwife of security policy and strategy,51 
at the same time States have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to cooper-
ate with other States to achieve shared goals or resolve common problems. 
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Globalization and its just-in-time and just-enough logistics imperatives have fun· 
damentally altered the strategic calculus, virtuall y mandating a cooperative ap· 
proach to maritime securi ty. Accordingly, the new maritime strategy must be 
mindful of national interests while remaining ever alert to shared interests. A strat-
egy that narrowly focuses on national interests will surely reinforce existing per· 
ceptions of the United States and drive away potential partners. By contrast, it takes 
but little imagination to see that a new maritime strategy that defines and articu· 
lates in compelling terms a framework for achieving shared goals and joint solu· 
tions to common problems is much more likely to make other States want to flock 
to the nascent I ,OOO·ship multinational navy.58 
Finding common ground among national interests should not be difficult. For 
some, the need to promote and protect the international trade and transportation 
system on which the globalized and energy·hungry world depends is a vi tal na· 
tional interest. 59 It is also a shared interest. In the words of some, "commerce craves 
security." For other States, particularly those in West Africa, South America and 
Southeast Asia, protecting offshore fisheries from poachers is not merely a pursuit 
of profit; it is a survival imperative. Still other States consider threats to the envi· 
ronment as national "security" issues. Consider, for example, small· island devel-
oping States, for whom global warming and its attendant rise in the sea level 
present an existential threat. A strategy that promotes sustainable and equitable ac· 
cess to marine living resources and protection of the marine environment is sure to 
have broad appeal. At the same time, however, none of these interests can be ob· 
tained if the larger system is fraught with disorder and violence. In Abraham 
Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, the need for security is exceeded only by basic 
needs, e.g., food.60 
Professor Colin Gray asserts that "order is the prime virtue; it is the essential 
prerequisite for security, peace, and possibly justice. Disorder is the worst condi· 
tion. "61 There is, in the minds of many, no longer a "war" to be won, only securi ty 
to be secured, extended and maintained, so that war can be prevented. The spread 
of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threatens chaos, as effective power 
shifts away from States to non·State actors and super·empowered individuals. To 
the extent that civilization rests in part on the control of violence, and the growing 
capacity of non·State actors to inflict such violence now casts a menacing shadow 
over the planet, the role of law as the deep stratum undergirding international se· 
curity becomes more apparent and more urgent. Law has the potential to serve as 
the indispensable binding force to check and perhaps reverse our social and insti-
tutional entropy. If the States' grip on law lessens, and States become increasingly 
prone to use military force, the binding force so vital to civilization may be fatally 
weakened. 
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In a geo-strategic environment everywhere characterized by growing uncer-
tainty, rapid change and instability, rule sets can promote greater predictability 
and stability. At the same time, rule sets are not legal pixie dust that miraculously 
brings order where there was once chaos. They must be given the level of respect 
and enforcement necessary for credibility or no State will be willing to rely on 
them. Rule sets like the UN Charter, the 1982 LOS Convention, anti-terrorism 
treaties and the non-proliferation regime can increase order, but only if they are 
complied with. 
We recognize that not all States and non-State actors will voluntarily comply 
with the rule sets, whether the rules under consideration are those relating to non-
aggression and non-proliferation or to trafficking for profit. If voluntary compli-
ance falls short, we must of course redouble our efforts to rebuild it to the level 
necessary for public order. That may come through education, inducement, de-
terrence, or capacity building of States, or of global or regional international orga-
nizations.62 But make no mistake, while each of these approaches will be vital to 
long-term success, they will likely never be sufficient unto themselves to provide 
the needed level of security in the coming years. For that, we must add 
enforcement. 
Because law is not self-executing, no security strategy should be founded on un-
realistic expectations regarding the influence of law on States (let alone on non-
State actors) in the conduct of their foreign and military affairs-particularly when 
sUlVival or vital State interests, or "fundamental" religious beliefs, are at stake. Nor 
should we delude ourselves about the effectiveness of international organizations 
in preselVing or restoring peace and security. Yet, even if, as Thomas Hobbes 
warned, "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure 
a man at all,"6) even the most committed contrarian would not counsel us to turn 
our backs on covenants. International law and international organizations like the 
United Nations will never be more effective or influential than the leading States 
allow them to be.64 If the new US maritime strategy ignores the role of either, we di-
minish the importance of both and undermine their effectiveness. The result will 
be a less ordered and less secure world. For that reason, it is vital that the maritime 
strategy provide a rule-based approach for enforcing the global legal order. 
In considering enforcement approaches I suggest that effective enforcement of 
global rule sets will require a new way of thinking that transcends the so-called 
"DIME" construct. The DIME approach, which looks to the State's diplomatic, in-
formation, military and economic "instruments of national power," is too narrow 
for a global environment in which non-State actors pose significant, even cataclys-
mic, risks to States.os This Cold War artifact, which is currently taught at US war 
colleges, assumes that only a narrow set of instrwnents is available and that they 
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will be used against States.66 In the post-Cold War, post-9I I I, post-Bali, Madrid, 
London subway and Lebanon 2006-2007 world, it is dear that instruments of na-
tional power will increasingly be used against non-State actors, like AI Qaeda, 
Hezbollah and transnational criminal syndicates, and that the DIME approach is 
not always well suited to them. The United States already reaches well beyond the 
DIME framework, using a variety ofleadership, managerial, institutional, cultural, 
technological, law enforcement, judicial and financial measures, such as freezing 
assets.67 Some of the rule violations that threaten public order are and will remain 
"M" (military) issues. But many are "enhanced L" (law enforcemen t) issues, call-
ing for enhanced law enforcement measures.68 This broader, "DIME-plus" frame-
work will be vital to any maritime strategy--certainly for the Coast Guard and 
other interagency players with maritime safety and security missions. The new 
strategy must also acknowledge that without the Coast Guard, US maritime forces 
will not have a seamless approach to maritime security, for without it the strategy 
will lack the only alternative "end game" to killing your adversaries or detaining 
them on remote islands: arresting and prosecuting them. The Coast Guard puts the 
"L" factor in what is otherwise a limited DIME tool kit for addressing many of our 
maritime security problems. The next strategy must adapt itself accordingly. 
Law IU a Unifying Theme 
Several of the outside experts engaged in the maritime strategy development pro-
cess hosted by the Naval War College highlighted the need for the new document 
to include a "compelling narrative" that will ensure it is read, studied and imple-
mented. How do you select a theme that will counter the scores of centrifugal 
forces, unify the elements of the strategy, and serve as the leadership spark and cat-
alyst to bring together the three maritime services with overlapping yet unique 
identities, the other interagency players so essential to the mission, and interna-
tional friends and allies, while at the same time winning over or at least muting inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations? I suggest that law and its 
proven, albeit imperfect, capability to promote order, security and prosperity can 
be a powerful unifying theme and force in the new maritime strategy in the globalized, 
media-sensitive world in which we find ourselves. In fact, the new strategy has the po-
tential to go a long way toward rehabilitating the reputation of the United States as an 
ovelWeening hegemon that has become tone deaf to the concerns of its allies.69 
Global security requires global cooperation and, for many, law provides the 
logic and language of cooperation. Adherence to shared rule sets can be an effective 
unifying force. Some would go so far as to say it is now embedded in the cosmopol-
itan DNA. For that reason, an explicit embrace of the rule oflaw could prove to be 
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one of the most attractive features of the new maritime strategy for the Navy's in-
teragency and international partners. Promotion and implementation of rule sets 
would give the strategy internal coherence and broad external appeal. Any strategy 
that downplays, or still worse denigrates, international law and international orga-
nizations, as does the current National Defense Strategy of the United States, ill 
serves the nation's long-term interest. Much of the world still considers the United 
Nations the primary if not sole source of legitimacy for the use of force. A strategy 
that suggests that military force will be deployed in a manner that some will con-
clude violates the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force or even the threat to 
use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a State, will 
further isolate the nation. 
The importance of common rule sets, based on international law as a unifying 
force in combined operations, will not be lost on those who observed the evolu-
tion of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the recent UN Security 
Council resolutions on proliferation threats to international peace and security. 
Both make clear that most of the world will insist on an approach that respects in-
ternationallaw. 
Early positions taken by then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton at the July 
2003 PSI-participating States' meeting in Brisbane suggested that with respect to 
legal justifications for PSI boardings, the United States was "taking nothing off the 
table," including the Article 51 right of self-defense. That was understood by some 
as advocating a position on boarding foreign flag vessels believed to be transporting 
weapons of mass destruction that might go beyond what current international law 
pennits. At their meeting in Paris three months later, several of the PSI-participating 
States responded to the US opening position with a call for all participating States 
to subscribe to a common Statement of Interdiction Principles. The two-page 
statement eventually adopted at that meeting, and still in force, twice expresses the 
participating States' commitment that PSI activities will be carried out in a manner 
consistent with international law. Similarly, Security Council Resolutions 1540, 
condemning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to or by non-State ac-
tors, and 1718, applying similar prohibitions to North Korea, both tie any enforce-
ment measures to the applicable rules of international law. 
Law and the Expectations of Our Partners 
Admiral Harry Ulrich, Commander, US Naval Forces Europe, espouses a relatively 
simple formula for the global war on terrorism: have more partners than your ad-
versaries have. The reasons are elementary. The struggle against disorder knows no 
flag. Waging that struggle has become a team sport. Vice Admiral Morgan has been 
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the leading voice for the 1,000-ship multinational navy/Global Maritime Partner· 
ship, a concept designed to attract the kind of partners Admiral Ulrich seeks. Does 
the Global Maritime Partnership (and the Global Fleet Station initiative70) need a 
unifying global maritime strategy that promises to respect the rules of interna-
tionallaw? Many of the potential 1,OOO-ship-navy partners think SO.11 
In their response to the November 2005 "1,000 Ship Navy" article by Admirals 
Morgan and Martoglio,12 the naval commanders of France, Ghana, India, Portugal 
and Spain all referred to the rule oflaw or legal considerations.13 The French com-
mander, for example, observed that any 1,000-ship-navy operations must be "in 
full compliance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea .... " Portugal ex-
pressly referred to the "rule of law," and India asked whether the 1,OOO-ship con-
cept should be established under the aegis of the United Nations. Admiral Soto of 
the Spanish Navy observed that "[ t logether we must find a legal solution to pre-
serving the natural flow of frie ndly maritime trade while denying freedom of action 
to those criminals who attempt to use the maritime space for illegal activities." It 
seems clear that respect for international law has the potential to unite or fracture 
the embryonic 1,000-ship navy. 
One year later, many of those same foreign CNOs were asked to respond to 
Admiral Mullen's plan for a new US maritime strategy.14 Once again, interna-
tionallaw figured prominently in several of the responses. The Commandant of 
the Brazilian Navy urged that the new strategy "be guided by principles sanc-
tioned by international law, " a viewed shared by the Secretary General of the Pe-
ruvian Navy and the Portuguese Navy Chief of Staff. Their counterpart in 
Colombia emphasized the need for an "international legal mechanism of cooper-
ation." Uruguay's reply was also directly on point: "Multilateral cooperation 
among navies is legitimate activity when it is based on the law." The Commander 
of the Lebanese Navy cited the 1982 LOS Convention and cautioned against the 
United States acting alone, while the new Chief of Staff for the Spanish Navy 
highlighted the need for the US Navy "to operate alongside its allies in accordance 
with international law." The Australian Maritime Doctrine elegantly and force-
fully captures the central importance of law and legitimacy for one of America' s 
most respected partners: 
Australia 's use of armed force must be subject to the test of legitimacy, in that the 
Government must have the capacity to demonstrate to the Parliament and the 
electorate that there is adequate moral and legal justification for its actions .... [T)his 
adherence to legitimacy and the democratic nature of the Australian nation state is a 
particular strength. It is a historical fact that liberal democracies have been more 
successful in the development and operation of maritime forces than other forms of 
government, principally because the intensity and complexity of the sustained effort 
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required for these capabilities places heavy demands upon a nation's systems of state 
credit, its technological and industrial infrastructure, and its educated population. 
Sophisticated combat forces, in other words, depend directly upon the support of the 
people for their continued existence?' 
Finally, a bit closer to home, in the 2007 US Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime 
Safety, Security, and Stewardship, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, who you 
will recall will be asked to join in the coming maritime strategy, has clearly identi-
fied the need to update and strengthen maritime regimes to address emergent 
threats and challenges and to support US ocean policy. More specifically, the Com-
mandant has concluded that the "nation needs a set of coordinated and interlock-
ing domestic and international regimes that ... balance competing uses within the 
maritime domain" and that "[sltrengthened rules, authorities, and agreements ... 
enable consistent, coordinated action on threats and provide an acceptable frame-
work of standards that facilitate commerce and maritime use. »?6 The lessons seem 
plain: a Navy-led maritime strategy that similarly acknowledges the important 
contributions of rule sets to promoting public order is far more likely to attract the 
support of international and interagency partners.?? 
Law and Our Opportunity to Shape and Influence 
Serious students of international law and relations understand that the law is not 
complete, nor is it perfect. We also know that it can and will be influenced, 
adapted, developed, clarified and explained-in other words, shaped-in the com-
ing years. Who will be most influential in the law development enterprise? Those 
who embrace the rule of law, while working to remedy its shortfalls, or those who 
sullenly tum their backs on the enterprise??! 
In his 2006 Current Strategy Forum remarks, Admiral Mullen cited as two of the 
nation's three enduring naval strengths the capacity to "influence" and "to build 
friends and partners." The legal experts had something to say about both. There 
seemed to be widespread agreement among the experts that it is not enough to sim-
ply know and follow the rules of international law; there is also an urgent need to 
shape those rules.79 For example, leadership on freedom of navigation and over-
flight- for warships and military aircraft and the commercial vessels and aircraft 
on which the global economy depends-will be crucial in the coming years. Some 
experts' assessments reveal the magnitude of the coming challenge to shape inter-
national maritime law on navigation issues: 
• 38 percent of the experts believe that the regime for innocent passage in the 
12-mile territorial sea will not remain stable between now and 2020. When they 
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were asked the same question about transit passage through international strai ts 
and archipelagic sea lanes passage, the numbers went up to 41 percent and 51 
percent respectively.SO 
• 95 percent of the experts believe that in the coming years more States will 
claim the right to exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in their 
200- mile exclusive economic zones.8] 
To lead on freedom of navigation and overflight, or any other law of the sea is-
sue, it is crucial that the United States become a party to the 1982 LOS Convention 
and participate in the United Nations' annual law of the sea processes. Moreover, 
to encourage others to respect those parts of the rule set about which we are most 
concerned-the navigation rights of warships and military aircraft and the non-
proliferation regime, for example-we must be dear that we respect the entire rule 
set,82 as consented to by each State, including the provisions that might seem less 
important or even "quaint" to us. We cannot hope to "shape" the global or regional 
legal order unless we are a good-faith participant in the system. After all, why 
would any State acquiesce in letting us help define a rule set if they know that we in-
tend to later exempt ourselves from it? 
At the same time, there is growing concern that law is increasingly used by less 
powerful States and by non-State actors as an asymmetric instrument to discredit or 
otherwise balance against more powerful States, even proclaiming that less powerful 
States are not bound by the same rules.lI3 It has been observed that less powerful 
States respond to sea control strategies by more powerful adversaries by employing 
sea denial strategies and tactics. Naval mines commonly come to mind,84 but lately 
"lawfare" strategies seek to restrict the navigation rights and freedom of action of 
powerful States by exerting pressure on them to bind themselves to new legal re-
gimes,S$ or by employing existing legal regimes to discredit the more powerful 
State. As Professor Davida Kellogg at the University of Maine has argued forcefully, 
the response to such tactics must not be a reflexive denigration oflaw, but rather a 
decisive and well-reasoned rejoinder that unmasks this abuse of the law.86 
The new maritime strategy will almost certainly have an effect on the law by what 
it says--or does not say-about the role oflaw in modern maritime security opera-
tions.81 In a system where international law is made in part by State practice, navies 
make international law every day by what they say and what they do. At the same 
time, and for the same reason, the strategy's treatment oflaw will affect the ability 
of the United States to influence the future direction of international regimes and 
organizations. The Navy can create or ease friction by what it says or does not say 
about the law in the new strategy and enhance or erode its credibility and therefore 
its effectiveness as a shaping influence.sa 
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Law's Role in Preserving and Enhancing the Service Ethos 
At an early Naval War College session involving veterans of prior Navy maritime 
strategy drafting teams, Professor Roger Barnett spoke of the importance of under-
standing the Navy's culture in crafting any capstone strategy document. That cul-
ture, it seems to me, plainly includes a deep appreciation for international law. In 
describing the most desirable qualifications for a naval officer, Captain John Paul 
Jones wrote more than two hundred years ago that the "naval officer should be fa-
miliar with the principles ofInternational Law .. . because such knowledge may of-
ten, when cruising at a distance from home, be necessary to protect his flag from 
insult o r his crew from imposition or injury in foreign portS."89 US Navy Regula-
tions have long codified the requirement for its members to comply with interna-
tional law.90 Compliance is facilitated by a proactive training and education 
program. 
International law was among the first subjects taught in the opening days of the 
Naval War College in 1884 and the Naval War College is still the only war college in 
the United States to have a dedicated International Law Department. The first ci-
vilian to join the Naval War College faculty was James R. Soley, appointed in the 
foundation year of the College to teach international law. In 1901, the well-known 
publicist John Bassett Moore joined the faculty as a professor of international law 
and later initiated the College's International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series. 
The first academic chair at the Naval War College was the Chair in International 
Law, established on July 11, 1951 , and filled by Harvard's Bemis ProfessorofInter-
national Law and Permanent CourtofInternational Justice Judge Manley O. Hud-
son . In 1967 the chair was named in honor of Rear Admiral Charles H. Stockton, 
an international law scholar and former president of the Naval War College. 
Our personnel have a right to expect that their capstone strategy will honor the rule 
oflaw. We have a new generation of men and women who are drawn to the all-volunteer 
forces by a combination of pride, patriotism and the need for self-affirmation. They 
are at their best when they believe in themselves, their service and their nation. Our 
accession programs and ceremonies emphasize respect for law and principle. The 
oath of office for military officers includes a pledge to support and defend the Con-
stitution of the United States-not a monarch, but rather a bodyoflaw. Our oldest 
warship in commission is named not after a president or a famous battle, but rather 
that same hallowed legal text. The core principles of the Navy, Marine Corps and 
Coast Guard all highlight the importance of honor, which for Marines expressly in-
cludes the obligation to respect human dignity. Those creeds also recognize the im-
portance of courage, one version of which expressly includes "moral courage," 
describing it as the inner strength to do what is right and to adhere to a higher 
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standard of conduct.'I1 The service members who take these oaths and are moved 
by these creeds represent our nation's finest, and they deserve to know more than 
merely how and where they will fight; they deserve to know why they fight-that 
is, the principles they are being asked to support and defend. The Navy lieutenant 
junior grade leading her boarding team onto a freighter in the Arabian Gulf to 
conduct a Proliferation Security Initiative boarding and the battalion landing team 
sergeant major ordering his Marines into the LCACs and CH-46s to execute a non-
combatant evacuation operation should both be able to see their core values re-
flected in the maritime strategy that sent them on their missions. 
Conclusion 
The decision by the Naval War College to integrate faculty from the College's In-
ternational Law Department and outside legal experts into the strategy develop-
ment process wisely ensured that the core strategy development team had access to 
a thoughtful and informed assessment of the future global legal order. Legal partic-
ipation in the process by no means assures that the law will playa role in the new 
strategy, but there's every reason to believe that it will. 
Respect for the rule oflaw is a signal strength fo r those who practice it and a vex-
atious, corrosive and embarrassing source of friction for those who fail to do so. By 
clearly embracing a position that promises respect for the rule of law in the new 
maritime strategy, the Navy can seize the opportunity to enhance its legitimacy and 
its ability to attract coalition partners, instill pride in its members and position it-
self more effectively to shape the global order. The Coast Guard has shown the way 
forward with its new Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship.92 But 
let there be no mistake: "respect" for the rule oflaw entails more than a one-sided 
obligation for the United States to obey the relevant laws advocated by 
asymmetricians.93 It also means that we will expect others to comply with the law, 
including those provisions that, in the words of John Paul Jones more than two 
centuries ago, "protect" the nation, its vessels and aircraft, and their navigational 
r ights and freedoms. 
With all the buildup it has been given, the new strategy must not fall short in 
providing a fresh and proactive approach to a demonstrably new threat environ-
ment that has shaken a lot of people's confidence in the US national security sys-
tem. It should be a strategy of hope and action, rather than one born of despair and 
cynicism. Whether you are an idealist aspiring to establish a shining city on the hill 
that reveres the rule oflaw for its own sake, or a calculating utilitarian methodically 
calibrating means to ends, there is much to value in a more robust rule of law, 
forcefully advocated by the three maritime service chiefs. For the utilitarians, ask 
19 
The Influence of Law on Sea Power Doctrines 
the Marines and soldiers in Fallu;ah, Ramadi and Kandahar whether the threat en-
vironment was better or worse after images of the disgraceful and lawless acts at the 
Abu Ghraib prison flashed across the Internet and Al Jazeera. While you' re at it, ask 
them how it affected their pride as American service members. We cannot always 
control the behavior of our members, but our service chiefs can be ftrm and un-
equivocal about the fundamental principles for which we stand. 
It must seem to many that the world has not changed much since the interwar 
years that drove Yeats to lament the loss of conviction by the best, the rise of pas-
sionate intensity by the worst, and the collapse of the "centre."94 What he left un-
named is the source and nature of that center and how we might fortify it. For 
many in Yeats' age, the ordering fo rce to provide that center was to be found in the 
hopeful vision of a new League of Nations. Their modern counterparts look to the 
rule of law developed and implemented by forward-thinking States coming to-
gether in respected and competent international organizations.95 
I will close with a report on the informal surveys I conduct each year at my law 
school. In the ftrst week of classes back in Seattle I ask my students for their views 
on the "rule oflaw." They have so far been unanimous in their approval of the prin-
ciple, though some are skeptical of its empirical record. But when I then ask them 
to define the rule of law, their brows furrow and they grow silently pensive. We 
shouldn't be too hard on them. Few law school casebooks attempt to describe the 
rule ofl aw or postulate its force or trajectory. And you will not be too surprised to 
learn that the Department of Defense dictionary does not define it. We must work 
to remedy that oversight. The legal profession has a well-earned reputation fo r per-
suasive communication. And I believe, as did Alexis de Tocqueville,96 that we in the 
legal profession have a special province and duty.lflaw is the logic and language of 
global cooperation, we are its most proficient expositors. As such, it is, I believe, in-
cumbent upon us all to embrace the rule oflaw as our lodestar, as the "center" for 
this tumultuous new century.97 In short, it is time for us to take up the baton from 
Professor O'Connell and advance it steadily forward toward that elusive ftnish line. 
Postscript on US Accession to the 1982 LOS Convent ion 
The legal experts widely agreed that the first challenge that must be met is to obtain 
the necessary Senate and presidential action for the United States to accede to the 
1982 LOS Convention . Nothing less than an all-agency full-court press will be suf-
ficient . If the three maritime services and their allied agencies fail to persuade the 
Senate to approve the LOS Convention during the One Hundred Tenth Congress, 
a maritime strategy that purports to affirm the importance oflaw to global security 
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will have no credibility. Words without consistent action will soon be ignored and 
forgotten. 
The call for Senate action was renewed when, during his January 30, 2007 con· 
firmation hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee to serve as Deputy Sec· 
retary of State, former Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte 
affirmed the administration's strong support for the Convention. One week later, 
the Department of Defense once again included the LOS Convention on its treaty 
priority list.98 The next day, the President's National Security Advisor, Stephen 
Hadley, wrote to Senator Joseph Biden, the new Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, citing the "historic bipartisan support for the Law of the Sea 
Convention" and requesting Senate action "as early as possible during the I IOth 
Congress."99 On May 15, 2007, President Bush formally announced that he was 
urging the Senate to give its advice and consent to accession to the Convention 
during the current session of the Congress.l OO On June 13,2007, Deputy Secretary 
of State Negroponte and Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England joined in 
an op·ed supporting accession. lol The Navy and Coast Guard have long worked to 
gain Senate approval for the Convention. A recommendation that the United 
States accede to the Convention was the first resolution to come out of the US 
Commission on Ocean Policy chaired by former CNO Admiral James Watkins. In 
testimony before the Congress on March I, 2007, Secretary of the Navy Donald 
Winter, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen and Commandant of the 
Marine Corps James Conway unequivocally affirmed the Navy Department's sup· 
port for US accession. 102 Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, 
similarly reaffirmed his service's support for accession on May 17, 2007.10) 
Thus, there is every reason to be optimistic about the fate of the 1982 LOS Con-
vention within the Senate this time. Painfully, however, we have been this close 
once before. It seemed like success was at hand in 2004, when Senator Lugar pro· 
vided the needed leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee to achieve a 
unanimous recommendation out of that Committee that the US Senate should pro· 
vide its assent. Somehow, however, a small but vocal opposition was able to persuade 
the Senate leadership not to bring the treaty to a floor vote. I04 If the Senate cannot 
now be persuaded to approve the LOS Convention, other parties to the Conven· 
tion will continue to shape developments in the Commission on Continental Shelf 
Limits, International Seabed Authority and International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea and, perhaps, add a gloss to the Convention's text through the recognized 
process of agreed-upon interpretations. los 
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